| Haris Zalkapli |
| Perkembangan dunia Islam terus menjadi berita-berita utama antarabangsa, memberi kesan kepada politik serantau dan global, bermula dengan serangan Israel ke atas Gaza pada Disember 2008 sehingga Januari 2009, kepada konflik di Yaman yang semakin merebak ke seluruh wilayah negara itu dan jiran. Berikut 10 berita dan pemain utama dalam dunia Islam, yang memberi kesan besar kepada negara terbabit, dunia Islam secara keseluruhan dan politik dunia. 1. Serangan terhadap Gaza, Palestin Dunia Islam memulakan tahun 2009 dengan menyaksikan konflik di Gaza, perang mempertemukan kekuatan tidak seimbang tentera Israel dengan Hamas dan kumpulan-kumpulan lain di wilayah Palestin dikuasai Hamas ini. Perang bermula pada Disember 2008. Awal 2009, Israel memulakan serangan darat selepas seminggu serangan udara. Perang berakhir pada 18 Januari, dua hari sebelum presiden baharu Amerika Syarikat, Barack Obama mengangkat sumpah. Hampir 1,500 warga Palestin dilaporkan terbunuh, dengan kemusnahan hampir AS$2 bilion. Israel turut menyerang masjid, sekolah dan tempat-tempat awam, membunuh semua termasuk kanak-kanak. Tidak lama selepas perang, Israel memilih sebuah kerajaan dikuasai parti berhaluan kanan. Demonstrasi diadakan di seluruh dunia membantah tindakan Israel. Reaksi di dunia Islam termasuk boikot terhadap jenama AS dan Barat seperti McDonald's, Tesco, Starbucks, KFC dan pelbagai produk konsumer lain. 2. Dasar luar baharu Turki Negara yang sedang menggerakkan dasar luar baharu, Turki, bertindak pragmatik dalam menangani isu Gaza melalui satu tindakan Perdana Menteri Recep Tayyip Erdogan dalam forum di Forum Ekonomi Dunia di Davos, Switzerland, menaikkan imej Turki ketika dunia Arab dilihat gagal bertindak. Di bawah arkitek dasar luar baharu Ahmet Davutoglu, akademik hubungan antarabangsa berpengalaman luas, Turki mengaktifkan usaha baharu membina hubungan baik dengan negara-negara jiran termasuk Armenia dan Syria dan cuba membina ruang pengaruh, berdasarkan fahaman pan-Turkisme atau apa yang disifatkan pemerhati sebagai perspektif "neo-Uthmaniyah" Ahmet. Ahmet, yang pengalamannya termasuk mengajar di Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Malaysia dan Universiti Beykent Istanbul, disebut sebagai "Henry Kissinger Turki" yang kini menjadi tokoh penting parti pemerintah, AKP. 3. Konflik Yaman Menjelang Ramadan tahun lalu, Yaman menyaksikan bermulanya konflik melibatkan kerajaan pimpinan Presiden Ali Abdullah Saleh dengan pemberontak Houthi di utara. Kini, setelah tiba bulan Muharram 1431, konflik di Yaman semakin meluas dan meningkat dari segi intensitinya, apabila AS mula terlibat dalam serangan terhadap kumpulan al-Qaeda di negara ini, kumpulan dikenali sebagai al-Qaeda di Semenanjung Arab (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP) menggabungkan al-Qaeda Yaman dengan Arab Saudi. Negara dilanda masalah sumber air dan hidrokarbon ini juga berdepan kebangkitan kumpulan pemisah Marxist di selatan. Penglibatan Saudi menyerang Houthi juga menambahkan kerumitan konflik ini, yang kini telah menyebabkan lebih 170,000 menjadi pelarian di dalam negara. Peranan Iran dan Saudi memperlihatkan dimensi persaingan kuasa serantau dalam konflik ini. 4. Pilihan raya presiden dan isu nuklear Iran Iran mengadakan pilihan raya presiden pada 12 Jun lalu, dengan keputusan penyandang Mahmoud Ahmadinejad mengekalkan jawatan. Walau bagaimanapun, keputusan ini ditentang hebat Mir Hossein Mousavi dan ribuan penyokongnya, menggegarkan republik Islam yang berpandukan kepada ide Wilayatul Faqih yang menetapkan kuasa kepada para ulama. Kebangkitan digelar "revolusi hijau" oleh kem Mir Hossein mendapat kredibiliti dan imej yang positif bagi sesetengah pihak kerana warna hijau yang digunakan - yang dikaitkan dengan Islam dan Nabi Muhammad saw - sebagai simbol gerakan menentang pemerintah Iran. Pemerintah Iran masih berdepan cabaran getir penentangan ini, yang mendapatkan simpati apabila Ayatullah Hossein Ali Montazeri meninggal dunia pada 20 Disember lalu. Pada masa yang sama, Iran terus berdepan cabaran berhubung isu nuklearnya apabila sikap kerajaan baharu AS tidak berubah walaupun sedia berunding. 5. Afghanistan-Pakistan dan Taliban Afghanistan dan Pakistan ditangani sebagai satu oleh sebahagian besar komuniti dasar luar AS, ekoran hubungan rapat kumpulan Taliban di kedua-dua negara dan kaitan rapat geografi kedua-dua negara dalam konflik di Afghanistan. Afghanistan kini menjadi satu agenda dasar luar penting bagi Obama, yang meluluskan 30,000 anggota tentera untuk dihantar ke negara ini. AS kini mempunyai kehadiran yang besar di Asia Tengah. Pada masa sama, Presiden hamid Karzai baharu melengkapkan anggota kabinetnya, yang dikritik ramai sebagai tidak memenuhi janji memerangi korupsi dan pada masa sama memberikan kuasa kepada pihak-pihak tidak sepatutnya. Kedatangan lebih ramai tentera AS dan pemerintahan Hamid yang tidak bersih dan bebas bakal meneruskan ketidaktentuan di Afghanistan. Kedatangan lebih ramai anggota tentera mampu meningkatkan lagi konflik dengan kumpulan militan. 6. Lanun dan kehadiran kuasa asing di Somalia Penculikan dan rampasan kapal oleh lanun Somalia yang mula berleluasa pada 2008 terus berlaku pada 2009, dan menarik kedatangan tentera-tentera laut asing termasuk Jepun dan Rusia, menjadikan kawasan perairan Somalia yang strategik itu semakin tegang. Kawasan Teluk Aden bersempadan Laut Merah - dihubungkan laluan sempit Bab al-Mandeeb di tengah-tengah antara Djibouti dan Eritrea dengan Yaman - ialah satu laluan penting dalam perdagangan antarabangsa. AS juga menjalankan operasi pesawat tanpa juruterbang di kawasan perairan ini. Kawasan ini terletak tidak jauh daripada Yaman, satu lagi kawasan panas yang menjadi salah satu sumber senjata bagi lanun Somalia. Selain itu, tentera AS dan Iran juga meningkatkan kehadiran di kawasan perairan ini, mengaitkannya dengan isu lanun dan juga ketidakstabilan di Tanduk Afrika dan Yaman. 7. Pilihan raya Lubnan Lubnan menjadi medan persaingan kuasa-kuasa asing sejak sekian lama, dan pilihan raya pada 7 Jun 2009 menunjukkan realiti ini kekal dalam permainan politik Lubnan. Kumpulan 14 Mac yang pro-Barat memenangi 71 daripada 128 kerusi, yang dibahagikan kepada 64 untuk Muslim dan 64 Kristian, susunan diwarisi daripada penjajahan Barat yang memberi kelebihan kepada Kristian. Saad Hariri dan kumpulan 14 Mac mendapat sokongan kuat AS, Arab Saudi dan Mesir, manakala Hizbullah dan Amal disokong Iran dan Syria. Kumpulan diketuai Hizbullah yang disebut-sebut akan menang tidak berjaya merealisasikan jangkaan itu, tetapi Lubnan meneruskan penubuhan kerajaan perpaduan seperti yang dilaksanakan penggal lepas, proses yang hanya selesai beberapa minggu lalu, dengan Saad mengetuai kerajaan baharu. 8. Uyghur di Xinjiang Wilayah Xinjiang menyaksikan kebangkitan rakyat berketurunan Uyghur memprotes layanan buruk kerajaan China dan dominasi kaum Cina han di wilayah tersebut. Di sini dapat diperhatikan perana Turki menggerakan kaum Uyghur daripada rumpun bangsa Turki sebagai sebahagian agendanya meluaskan ruang pengaruh. Ankara dan Beijing bertikam lidah dalam hal ini, dengan Turki berperanan sebagai pembela nasib Uyghur ketika China dilihat di seluruh dunia sebagai penindas. Dengan sokongan Turki dan AS, Rebiya Kader, tokoh Uyghur berpangkalan di Washington muncul sebagai ikon kaum tertindas ini, hampir menyamai peranan dimainkan Dalai Lama bagi Tibet. Perkembangan ini, yang berlanjutan selama beberapa bulan, menyumbang dalam menjadikan perjuangan Uyghur menuntut kebebasan dalam hal berkaitan agama dan budaya menjadi perhatian dunia Islam untuk satu tempoh. 9. Libya dan pembebasan Abdel Baset al-Megrahi Abdel Baset al-Megrahi, disabit bersalah dalam pembunuhan 270 orang akibat pengeboman pesawat AS, Pan Am 103 di ruang udara Lockerbia, Scotland pada 21 Disember, 1988. Beliau dijatuhi hukuman penjara seumur hidup. Negaranya, Libya, menjadi tumpuan negara-negara Barat terbabit dan diletakkan sebagai satu musuh utama untuk satu tempoh yang panjang. Pada 20 Ogos lalu, beliau dibebaskan atas dasar kemanusiaan kerana dinilai doktor menghidap kanser prostat dan hanya akan hidup kurang tiga bulan lagi. Satu debat politik antarabangsa berlangsung ekoran tindakan kerajaan Scotland ini. Abdel Baset masih berusaha membersihkan namanya daripada tuduhan terlibat dalam pengeboman itu. Keadaan sekitar pembebasan Abdel Baset mengundang pelbagai spekulasi berhubung rundingan pembebasan beliau melibatkan kerajaan terbabit. 10. Islamofobia di Eropah Di Dresden, timur Jerman, pada 11 November lalu, Alexander Wiens, pembunuh Marwa al-Sherbini dijatuhi hukuman penjara seumur hidup. Wiens disabit membunuh Marwa akibat prejudisnya terhadap wanita Muslim berasal Mesir itu. Beberapa minggu lalu, di Switzerland, usaha mengharamkan menara masjid di negara itu mendapat sokongan 57 peratus pengundi negara Eropah itu. Sentimen itu sampai ke Belanda dan Jerman, apabila ahli-ahli politik berhaluan kanan di sana melahirkan sentimen yang sama. Sebelum itu, di Cologne, Jerman dan di utara London, Inggeris, protes terhadap masjid telah berlaku, memperlihatkan sentimen yang semakin disuarakan di Eropah, walaupun tidak kelihatan mendapat sokongan popular. Perkembangan ini menimbulkan persoalan tentang potensi ancaman kepada kepelbagaian budaya dan kebebasan beragama di Eropah. |
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Politik dunia Islam 2009: 10 berita utama
Monday, November 02, 2009
Beyond the Barisan Nasional? A Gramscian perspective of the 2008 Malaysian general election.(Report)
Article from:
The 8 March 2008 general election in Malaysia has been characterised as a "political tsunami". (2) The ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition (3) suffered unprecedented losses while the primary peninsular opposition parties--Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People's Justice Party, PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)--posted remarkable gains. This was a particularly stunning result for the opposition considering the outcome of the previous general election in 2004 when the BN swept the Dewan Rakyat, Malaysia's lower house, winning 198 seats to the opposition's combined total of 21, plus all but one state legislature. In contrast, 2008 represents a significant reversal for the BN coalition with its share of seats in the Dewan Rakyat plunging to 63 per cent and its overall popular vote to 51 per cent. Four additional state governments also fell to the opposition.
In the aftermath of March 2008 the Malaysian political landscape has gone through a number of upheavals with questions raised over the continuing viability of BN coalition rule and the future sociopolitical direction of the country. Two issues in particular stand out. First, the BN coalition has lost its two-thirds majority in parliament and therefore its ability to amend the constitution unimpeded, a critical indicator of political legitimacy in Malaysia. Secondly, on 1 April, PKR, PAS and the DAP officially joined forces to form the Pakatan Rakyat (People's Alliance, PR). (4) While the PR does not yet officially have the numbers in parliament to gain control of the government, its de facto leader, Anwar Ibrahim, has publicly claimed to have the necessary numbers willing to cross over from the BN and join the PR. Explicitly contained within both issues are questions concerning the evolving nature of national identity and, in particular, the need for all parties to seriously consider the concept of bangsa Malaysia, a Malaysian nation that transcends ethnic identity. Such concerns about the constitution of national identity are clearly reflected in the 2008 results, which point to a pluralisation of the political system and a popular desire for a more inclusive, ethnically-neutral political discourse.
However, is this rosy picture accurate? On the surface, the 1999 elections promised similar possibilities for increased sociopolitical pluralisation only for the ruling BN coalition to recoup its losses in 2004. In other words, is Malaysia now witnessing a truly progressive moment, one that is long-term and structural, or is this instead a short-term, regressive, "restorative" moment? By adopting a Gramsican perspective this article endeavours to offer a more nuanced analysis of the recent elections and, in particular, their meaning vis-a-vis conceptions of national identity. In the process, it seeks to explore the development and complex operation of hegemony in contemporary Malaysia.
This article will proceed in three distinct parts. Part one will outline the rationale for employing a Gramscian perspective, highlighting the relevant key Gramscian concepts useful for raising and answering questions about hegemony and crises. The following section will historicize the 2008 election with reference to the general elections of 1999 and 2004. The final part of the article will examine more closely the 2008 election results and the aftermath of the elections with particular reference to the possibility for transformation in Malaysian politics and society. This article will conclude with thoughts on whether we are witnessing an "organic" (relatively permanent) or "conjunctural" (immediate and ephemeral) crisis in Malaysia today.
A Gramscian Framework
At first glance, it may seem a peculiar choice to invoke Gramsci's conceptual theorizing in order to analyse a general election in contemporary, multi-ethnic Malaysia. However, his concepts offer a distinctive theoretical perspective which can help map out the complex and varying relationships between economy, polity and society in such countries. (5) Each of the "thinking tools" Gramsci offers is of interest precisely because they provide the vocabulary for considering questions surrounding the complex operation of hegemony in a country like Malaysia, as well as its future prospects for long-term socio-political change.
At the centre of Gramsci's thought is his theory of hegemony, which is based on a rich conceptualization of power. In particular, Gramsci draws upon Machiavelli's metaphor of the ruler as a centaur who "must know well how to imitate beasts as well as employing properly human means" (6) when exercising power or authority. Gramsci's concept of hegemony critically acknowledges the active role of subordinate people in the operation of power and thus allows for a nuanced conception of political and cultural authority. (7) Coercion alone results in only a "limited" or "dominative" hegemony in which the ruling group seeks to neutralize or decapitate the demands of the subaltern group(s). In order to achieve an "expansive" or "aspirational" hegemony, the hegemonic group must also actively seek the consent of subalterns. Gramsci's notion of "hegemony" is sensitive, therefore, to issues of both power and legitimacy.
According to Gramsci, consent is created and recreated by the hegemony of the ruling stratum in society. Far from dominating its junior partners, a successful hegemonic group has to thoroughly recreate itself, it must make large parts of its subalterns' worldview its own and in the course of doing so is itself altered. The moment of hegemony then represents the pinnacle of a dynamic and endless process in which the dominant group succeeds in propagating itself through society, bringing about intellectual and moral as well as economic and political unity. (8) However, this notion of hegemony as a continual process emphasizes the fact that a leading group must be constantly alert to the volatile demands of its subalterns and to the shifting historical terrain upon which it exercises its authority if it is to maintain power. A ruling stratum that asks for consent and yet which cannot give voice to the aspirations of those in whose name it rules will not survive indefinitely.
One of the key elements of any hegemonic strategy designed to acquire consent is the formation of links with existing elements of culture. Stuart Hall notes that "culture" should be interpreted here as, "the actual, grounded terrain of practices, representations, languages and customs of any specific historical society". (9) This includes the whole range of questions that Gramsci lumped together under the title "the national-popular" which he understood as constituting a crucial site for the construction of a popular hegemony. (10) Any cultural project, such as the construction of a "national" identity for example, could not be something imposed upon the people from above. Instead, it had to be rooted in the "humus of popular culture as it is, with its tastes and tendencies and with its moral and intellectual world". (11) This is what he referred to as "common sense"--the often fragmentary and contradictory "stratified deposits" of more lucid philosophical systems which have become "facts of life". Its significance lies in that it is the "taken-for-granted terrain" upon which, "more coherent ideologies and philosophies must contend for mastery ... if they are to shape the conceptions of the world of the masses and in that way become historically effective". (12)
The (re)creation of and contestations surrounding consent, and therefore hegemony, take place through the institutions of civil society. (13) Although Gramsci's use of the term varies, civil society can be appropriately thought of as "the network of institutions and practices in society that enjoy some autonomy from the state, and through which groups and individuals organize, represent, and express themselves to each other and the state." (14) As such, it accounts for individual tastes, behaviours and values as well as regulated cultural institutions. For Gramsci, whoever controls civil society succeeds in manufacturing consent among the masses and, as such, there is a need to pay more attention to ideological rather than coercive domination. As the ruling stratum's hegemony over civil society is never total, a constant re-packaging of ideology is necessary. (15) There are varying degrees of consent but as this consent is never "complete" regimes are sometimes forced to rely on laws, regulations and outright suppression in order to silence dissent. Gramsci is, in effect, expanding the definition of the state; advocating the vision of an "integral" state, one that is, "no longer conceived as simply an administrative and coercive apparatus--it is also 'educative and formative'." (16) It is the complexity of the interrelationships between the state and civil society that demands our attention and rejects any picture of the "post-colonial state" that assumes a simple, dominative or instrumental model of state power. This interactive view of the relationship between the state and civil society not only demonstrates how the state might seek to manufacture legitimacy via civil society but also simultaneously reveals the shape of potential challenges to any such hegemonic strategy.
Perhaps the main challenge that any hegemonic strategy faces is that consent is inherently unstable; a consequence of the historical specificity of any particular "moment" of hegemony. Of critical importance in any analysis of a hegemonic strategy is Gramsci's idea of "the continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria". (17) Hegemony is never imposed aprioristically but is always developed within the social, economic and political relations of a particular situation. There is nothing automatic about any period of hegemonic "settlement"; such moments have to be actively constructed and positively maintained within a context of shifting relations. (18) Societal transformation, then, hinges upon a successful counterohegemonic struggle in civil society, in which the prevailing hegemony is undermined thereby allowing an alternative hegemonic power bloc to emerge.
Gramsci describes such periods of heightened hegemonic activity in which consensus dissolves into dissensus as "crises". In such instances it becomes apparent that the ruling stratum in society has failed in its attempt to construct an expansive hegemony and runs the risk of allowing counter-hegemonic forces the opportunity to fill the consensual vacuum. (19) Gramsci insists upon the importance of distinguishing between "organic" and "conjunctural" crises in such analyses: the former are a result of deep and incurable problems whereas the latter are more immediate and temporary and can be settled one way or another by the ruling stratum. (20) Gramsci stresses that any particular crisis needs to be understood not only in terms of the immediate economic and/or political concerns but also in the "incessant and persistent efforts" made by the ruling stratum in order to defend and maintain the existing system. (21) In the case of an organic crisis, such efforts cannot be purely defensive--the ruling stratum must seek to reshape state institutions as well as form new ideologies. In this fashion, and only if the counter-hegemonic opposition forces are not strong enough to shift the balance of power decisively in their favour, will the ruling stratum potentially succeed in re-establishing its hegemony.
In light of the Gramscian framework outlined above, the question now becomes whether or not the current situation in Malaysia following the political upheavals associated with the March 2008 general election can be accurately identified as a conjunctural or organic crisis. Rather than focusing on the immediate moment itself Gramsci suggests that we should concentrate instead on the development over time of any particular social formation. (22) A review of the electoral trends from 1999 will put into perspective the 2008 electoral results as well as outline potential shifts in the fundamental structure within society that, in turn, define the present horizon of possibilities. (23)
Contextualizing 2008: The General Elections of 1999 and 2004
The 1999 general election in Malaysia followed fifteen dramatic months in Malaysian politics which tested the consensual hegemonic authority that the Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, and the BN had cultivated throughout the preceding decade. (24) On the economic level, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 threatened the prosperity that supplied the material base for Mahathir's Vision 2020 project designed to ensure that the country achieved newly industrialized country (NIC) status by that year. More critical, however, was the way in which this economic crisis precipitated a political crisis that eventually led to Anwar Ibrahim, the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, being sacked from his official government positions on 1 September 1998 and then formally expelled from the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) three days later. On 8 September, Anwar issued a declaration that defiantly called for Reformasi--for social and political reforms that opposed Mahathir's "cronyistic" responses to the financial crisis. After his arrest on 20 September on corruption and sodomy charges, Anwar's call for Reformasi resonated beyond most expectations, blossoming into a social movement opposed to Mahathir, UMNO and the BN.
The significance of Reformasi lay in the changing nature of processes of legitimation in Malaysia during the 1990s, itself a consequence of a specific conjunction of economic developments, political initiatives and ideological influences. (25) In this sense, social control in Malaysia had become organized around a more nuanced mix of state coercion and civil persuasion, indicating the growing importance of civil society as a contested space. Again, hegemony is a managed affair and legitimacy involves being able to persuade people, more generally, of the "moral authority" of the prevailing system. It was this "moral authority" of the BN regime, and of UMNO in particular, that Reformasi challenged. On one level, the movement represented Malay cultural revulsion at the manner in which Anwar was humiliated and shamed. On another level, Reformasi denoted a site of social criticism. At yet another level, it signified a massive erosion of the regime's hegemony over civil society based as it was on "rapid economic growth and continued prosperity, nationalist vision and popular support, and strong leadership and managed succession" all of which had been battered by the crises of July 1997 and September 1998. (26)
While initially a predominantly "Malay phenomenon", the Reformasi movement at its height, "achieved a cross-cultural breakthrough that created novel possibilities of multi-ethnic alliance" in the form of the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front, BA). (27) While no summary account of the path from inchoate movement to electoral coalition can adequately canvass the internal problems which paved the way, by November 1999 the BA had become sufficiently unified that it was prepared to offer itself as the alternative to the BN in a general election. Immediate analyses of the election results ranged from those who viewed them as "a watershed in Malaysian politics" to those who cynically observed that they were "much ado about nothing". (28) While on the surface the results apparently confirmed the latter opinion, such a raw interpretation conceals important features which pointed to the emergence of new political realities, ones that lend themselves well to the Gramscian framework outlined above. Most significantly, the election results were the worst electoral setback UMNO had ever experienced. (29) Tellingly, perhaps half of the Malay vote went to the opposition as it became apparent that UMNO had lost credibility as the hegemonic Malay party and could not "expect 100 per cent support from a rapidly changing Malay population based simply on its 'Malay credentials' ... [leaving it to] ponder how it will strategically engage in the contest for the Malay vote". (30) The Anwar affair suggested that UMNO's factionalism, a feature of the party since its inception, was, "not only chronic but had become systemic" (31) and could now be considered the chief source of political instability in the country. Such features would seem to indicate the failure of attempts on the part of the ruling stratum to construct and maintain an expansive hegemony.
Some analysts, taking the results at face value, interpreted them as an instance of the electorate registering a protest vote against the BN coalition, rather than truly seeking to replace it with an alternative. (32) However, a deeper Gramscian perspective suggests that while the 1999 election did indeed fail to produce a viable multi-ethnic opposition that could institute a meaningful two-coalition system, a key shift in popular consciousness meant that the situation could not, "return to 'square one': the Anwar affair and the Malay voters' response had exposed the fragility of UMNO's claim to be the principle source of stability in the political system." (33) Undoubtedly, a shift had occurred in Malaysia's socio-political landscape challenging long-established foundations of hegemony and legitimacy: an organic crisis.
On the surface, however, the results of the March 2004 general election would seem to refute such a view of 1999 as an organic crisis. The final election results took most observers by surprise with the ruling BN coalition enjoying its best showing since it was formed in 1974, bouncing back with 90.4 per cent of parliamentary seats and capturing 63.37 per cent of the total vote (up from 56.5 per cent in 1999). (34) What is even more significant is that UMNO reversed the losses it experienced in 1999 winning 92 per cent of the seats it contested, a clear indication of its renewed credibility among the Malay population. Other component parties within the BN coalition also performed well. By contrast, PAS and KeADILan suffered crushing defeats. What factors might explain the sheer magnitude of the BN's surprising electoral victory?
Several aspects of the Malaysian political scene are significant in this respect. In the first place, there is the culture of what Hilley has referred to as "insiderism", the features of which permeate all parts of the social order. The subtle filtering of dominant, BN/UMNO-prescribed, national values informs the context within which opposition parties and NGO's operate, encouraging them to address social issues from "within a 'problem-solving' mode of analysis". (35) While Reformasi provided new space for the articulation of a non-ethnic politics, the potentially counter-hegemonic BA coalition was unable to operate as an organic entity and avoid narrow party interests. In particular, the BA was unable to manage BN provocation and contain tensions over the role of religion, which eventually led to the departure of the DAP over the issue of an Islamic state. By continuing to operate within the "BN system", the BA was unable to take full advantage of the new political opportunities that Reformasi engendered, in particular, the possibility of a non-BN led government. (36)
Perhaps even more important were transformations in the relationship between the state and civil society as the ruling stratum reacted to the electoral results of 1999. Arguably the most important element here was the ascension of Abdullah Badawi to the office of Prime Minister in October 2003 following Mahathir's resignation. Abdullah immediately proceeded to carve out his own identity and began 2004 by, "articulating a broad reform agenda including improved governance, stronger political institutions, and a softer approach to human rights". (37) In other words, Abdullah tapped into the prevailing "common sense" and reconstructed the BN's hegemony by successfully co-opting the Reformasi momentum of the opposition. This, together with the performance legitimacy afforded the BN government by the upturn in the Malaysian economy along with the considerable perks of incumbency meant that the 2004 election was over before it began. Here then was a clear example of a hegemonic strategy--the "incessant and persistent efforts"--employed by the ruling stratum to defend and maintain the existing system by regaining the active consent of subaltern groups within civil society. The period 1999-2004 can thus be regarded as a restorative moment, one that involved no fundamental structural reorganization as the ruling stratum in control of the state sought to re-articulate, via a "problem-solving" mode of analysis, the hegemonic nexus between power and legitimacy.
How then from this seemingly secure position in 2004 did the ruling BN coalition fall so far only four years later? If one casts a critical Gramscian eye over the period 1999-2008 some clues become visible, signs that point to a more accurate evaluation of 1999 as an organic crisis. In many ways, the "actual, grounded terrain of practices, representations, languages and customs" in Malaysia changed over this period and the BN coalition, was unable or unwilling to adapt to these changes in "culture". As Khoo argues, the Reformasi ferment of 1998 and the elections of 1999 indicated that UMNO was "fast approaching a state of systemic failure. As it were the 'party of the Malays' was trapped." (38) UMNO's dilemma after 1999 was thus, "whether to develop a broader ethnic base [as indicated by the Reformasi movement] or seek to reclaim its lost Malay support through a more pronounced religious agenda". (39) As I argue below, this dilemma remained largely unresolved by 2008 as is reflected in the electoral backlash against UMNO and the BN. Furthermore, despite initial recognition on the part of UMNO leaders and pro-government analysts after the 1999 elections of the need for UMNO to reform and listen to the voice of the electorate, no immediate reform was undertaken by Mahathir. I suggest that even those efforts made by Abdullah to rejuvenate or reinvent UMNO after his ascension as Prime Minister were unable to overcome the systemic deficiencies of the party and, therefore, rather than being interpreted as an unequivocal mandate for Abdullah's government and its hegemony, the 2004 election results demonstrate Gramsci's critical notion of the "continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria". In this sense, 2004 should be considered an aberration, a blip in a direct line between 1999 and 2008, where a combination of factors, both external and internal to the coalition, frustrated the BA's attempts at genuine reform of the Malaysian political system. A Gramscian perspective reminds us that there is nothing inevitable or inexorable about any (counter-)hegemonic project, a lesson that the 2004 elections amply demonstrated. However, much still remained vague about the trajectory of politics after 2004; tracing this trajectory leads to the elections of 2008. (40)
The 2008 General Elections: Organic or Conjunctural Crisis?
It has been noted that the results of the 2008 general election suggest that the ruling stratum failed to keep pace with some of the fundamental socio-economic transformations occurring in the terrain of Malaysian society. (41) For the purposes of analysing such transformations, Malaysian society can be divided, somewhat crudely, into two groups--Malays and non-Malays. Tensions between the two groups had been simmering since 2004, stirred by a number of factors. Religious controversies, including the destruction of dozens of Indian temples and a series of challenges to non-Muslims' legal rights, as well as the incendiary pro-Malay and pro-Muslim rhetoric of leading figures in UMNO, particularly at the 2006 UMNO general assembly, all played significant roles in exciting such frictions. In addition, non-Malays had long been frustrated by a sense of socioeconomic marginalization fostered by the affirmative action policies of the government in favour of the majority Malay population. (42) Ironically, these redistributive and developmental policies had also resulted in an acute spatial and intra-Malay divide with the emergence of a new Malay urban middle-class "comprising independent, dynamic, professional Malays at ease in inter-ethnic economic and social relationships" (43) existing together with rural Malays who remained poor despite the presence of policies ostensibly designed to improve their status. Although both rural and urban Malays had returned to UMNO in large numbers at the 2004 elections, by 2008 both sections of Malay society had once again become disgruntled with their leadership, as they had been in 1999. Despite his promises for a more open and inclusive form of governance intended to benefit all Malaysians, the huge swing against the BN can be interpreted as, "Malaysians standing cohesively in opposition to Abdullah for failing to deliver on his pledges." (44)
However, while the BN knew that the 2008 elections posed a real challenge to its authority, the extent of the ruling coalition's losses took many observers by surprise. The final results were approximately double the predicted swing of less than 15 per cent, or 30 to 40 parliamentary seats. The BN coalition won just 140 of the 222 parliamentary seats on offer and only 51.2 per cent of the valid popular vote. (45) All of the main component parties of the BN suffered. In fact, the BN majority in parliament hinged upon its support in Sabah and Sarawak where it won 55 of the 57 parliamentary seats on offer. In contrast, all of the opposition parties posted remarkable gains with the PKR increasing its presence in parliament from a solitary seat in 2004 to 31 seats in 2008, PAS secured 23 seats compared to its 7 seats in 2004 and the DAP won 28 seats, up from its previous 12 seats. These gains increased the total opposition presence in parliament to 82 seats from 21 seats in 2004.
Any attempt to make sense of the 2008 general election results centres on accounting for the swing against the BN coalition. The BN lost support across all ethnic communities although this loss was more apparent among non-Malays. It has been estimated that Indian support for the BN plummeted from an estimated 82 to 48 per cent while Chinese support dropped from an estimated 65 to 35 per cent. Malay support, on the other hand, held relatively steady, with only a 5 per cent swing against the government. (46) A number of points need to be highlighted, however, when interpreting these results. In the first place, the vote swings were not uniformly distributed, with the northern states of Malaysia (Penang, Kedah and Kelantan) and major cities bearing the brunt of the "tsunami" whereas the rest of the country saw some of the old patterns of voting remain intact. (47) That is, the groundswell for change that the 2008 elections seem to demonstrate has not reached all parts of Malaysia. Secondly, with regard to the non-Malay swing against the BN, it apparently occurred, "almost regardless of the opposition party in question or the race of that candidate". (48) Several Malaysian political commentators have drawn upon these points in order to argue for the political maturation of the Malaysian electorate. Not only do the election results point to the disconnect that exists between the ruling stratum and the people whose consent it relies upon but they also indicated how the terrain of Malaysian society and politics is moving to a middle ground of sorts, one less communal in nature. (49) In many ways this is a return to the promise of 1999. The difference in 2008 is that the BN no longer lays sole claim to the broad middle ground and has now been left behind by an opposition who under Anwar's leadership has better read the shifts in sentiment among the Malaysian population.
Viewing the 2008 election results through a Gramscian lens it appears that the legitimacy of the ruling BN coalition's hegemonic principles diminished to the point where a "crisis of authority" emerged. Gramsci notes that in order to counter such a loss of legitimacy, a ruling stratum has to decide on the balance between coercion and consent in attempting to reassert its hegemony within society, a decision that, in turn, relies on correctly determining whether the crisis is conjunctural or organic in nature. Events in the immediate aftermath of the election suggest that the BN leadership viewed the election results as if they were a conjunctural crisis. Accordingly, the government adopted a range of defensive measures designed to regain consent. One such measure involves throwing money at the problem and the federal government's 2009 budget proposal, which was presented to parliament on 29 August, offered generous spending increases. On the coercive side, there have been flesh allegations of sodomy levelled at Anwar as well as the arrests of two bloggers and one parliamentarian under the Internal Security Act for allegedly heightening racial tensions. In addition, the UMNOPAS talks following the elections could be viewed as an attempt by the ruling stratum to keep subaltern social groups fragmented and passive within civil society. (50)
The danger for the ruling coalition and its continuing hegemony lies in a misinterpretation of the nature of the crisis posed by the election results, based on an ahistorical reading of the elections. If it believes, as the actions listed above indicate, that 2008 is a historically specific conjunctural crisis and enacts only defensive measures, when it is actually facing an organic crisis, then it runs the risk of its hegemony closing down and becoming ossified. This would then eventually give rise to a "dominative hegemony" where authority has lost its legitimacy and can only operate as naked coercive power. It is worth reflecting once again on Gramsci's analysis of organic crises for if, as I suggest, 2008 actually represents the continuation of an organic crisis that finds its genesis in the late1990s, then state institutions in Malaysia must be reshaped and new ideologies formulated and implemented for the emergence of a new expansive hegemony based on the socio-political transformations first wrought by the events of 1997-98. Whether hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, the power bloc that best reads the shifting political and social terrain and thereby is able to give voice to the aspirations of those in whose name it purports to rule will be better positioned to advance its hegemonic project. If this is an organic crisis then the measures outlined above will not be enough to win back consent and re-legitimate the BN's hegemony.
One aspect that potentially points to 2008 representing an organic crisis is the notion of national identity in Malaysia, more specifically, the concept of bangsa Malaysia, first mooted in 1991 by Mahathir as part of his Vision 2020. While Mahathir's use of the term remains subject to conjecture, this notion of a Malaysian nation that transcended ethnic identity captured the popular imagination of Malaysians and suggested new forms of identification. (51) As a recent poll indicates, the issue of national identity continues to resonate among the Malaysian population. (52) Politics, however, remained steadfastly communal in nature despite public endorsements of the bangsa Malaysia by politicians of all persuasions. For instance, past and present UMNO presidents while publicly subscribing to the concept have had to contend with repeated calls from within the party for ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy). The elections of 2008 represent something of a change in this regard, particularly as the opposition gains can be seen as a robust public endorsement of their multiracial aspirations. In particular, the stunning revival of the now truly multi-ethnic PKR from its near oblivion in 2004 to becoming the single largest opposition party indicates a real change in the terrain of Malaysian society. Even elements within UMNO have belatedly recognized the need for deeper reform. On 15 July 2008, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, a senior UMNO leader, outlined the challenges facing the party and, by extension, the ruling coalition. Among the factors responsible for the party's abysmal performance he noted the failure to develop policies transcending race and ethnicity. (53) This widespread concern with the notion of a more inclusive conceptualization of a bangsa Malaysia reflects distinct changes in Malaysian society since the ethnic riots of 1969. To put it succinctly, it has become increasingly apparent that the changing nature of wealth and income inequality in Malaysia suggests the need for universal-type policies rather than those that target a specific ethnic community. This, in turn, implies the pluralization of the Malaysian political system, demanding not only a meaningful dialogue on the concept of a truly inclusive bangsa Malaysia but also pointing to some possible avenues for such transformation.
If 2008 is, in fact, part of a continuing organic crisis there are any number of potential areas for transformation in the Malaysian socio-political system. In the interests of brevity, however, only two will be touched on. In recent years the National Economic Policy (NEP) has been criticized as an inefficient system that not only unfairly discriminates against non-Malays but has also failed to adequately redistribute wealth to most bumiputera. In both cases the NEP has been criticized for not dealing directly with issues of economic inequality; rather than helping the poor, as a class irrespective of ethnicity, it has become an institutionalized system of government handouts for the majority ethnic community in Malaysia. In particular, the practice of categorizing all bumiputera as a single group theoretically allows for the possibility of a gross imbalance in the relative holdings of national wealth among individuals within this social grouping and has led to criticism that some bumiputera remain economically marginalized. (54) Although Abdullah did raise this issue during his maiden speech as UMNO president in 2004, his views were not universally shared and no substantive action was taken to address concerns about the NEP. A central campaign pledge of the opposition during the 2008 elections was a promise to scrap the NEP and implement a needs-based system irrespective of one's ethnicity. Since the March elections the NEP has come under increased scrutiny with the new Penang Chief Minister, Lim Guan Eng, vowing to scrap such programmes and consequently attracting the ire of at least one government minister. (55) In reality, Guan Eng was probably guilty of no more than the poor articulation of what a clear majority of Malaysians believe--that the BN's "race-based affirmative action policy is obsolete and must be replaced with a merit-based policy". (56) Such sentiments have even been recognized by the government with the Deputy Prime Minister (and Prime Minister-designate), Najib Razak, stating his preparedness to end special privileges for the bumiputera, commenting that "if we do not change, the people will change us" and that in the not-too-distant future, Malaysia would see the NEP being replaced; a stance that would bring the government closer to the position of the Pakatan Rakyat (PR). (57) However, Najib did not offer any specific timetable and cautioned against any expectation of a quick change. Crucially, he explicitly referred the enormity of the challenge, one that many political analysts believe is beyond UMNO's present capabilities. (58)
A second, and somewhat related, possible avenue for sociopolitical transformation in Malaysia as a result of an organic crisis lies in the Federal Constitution. Any constitution is, in effect, a contract between a government and its citizenry and, like all contracts, is subject to negotiation and compromise. This is apparent in those provisions contained within the Federal Constitution which refer to the special rights of the Malays (and later the native peoples of Sabah and Sarawak). Without denying the existence of such stipulations, it is important to recognize the context within which they were negotiated if they are to be tested now. Article 153(1) states that: "It shall be the responsibility of the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong [Malaysia's constitutional monarch] to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this Article." (59) In the first place, the report of the independent commission charged with drafting the Federal Constitution noted the difficulty of reconciling such special rights with the notion of a common nationality for the whole of the Federation. (60) In fact, the Alliance Party, the BN's precursor, advanced a submission that in an independent Malaya, "all nationals should be accorded equal rights, privileges and opportunities and there must not be discrimination on grounds of race and creed"; (61) a notion that the Rulers (Sultans) also agreed with in essence. In the end, the commission observed that "the special position of the Malays" had historical precedence and should therefore be reflected in the wording of the Constitution. However, the commission also recommended that while the Malays should be assured that special rights would continue for a substantial period eventually such provisions, "should be reduced and should ultimately cease so that there should then be no discrimination between races and communities". (62)
The ethnic riots of May 1969 put on hold any such thoughts for the reduction and/or elimination of "the special position of the Malays". Under the NEP there was a clear realignment of both political and economic power that subsequently gave rise to a desire to realign the balance undergirding the Federal Constitution. This becomes evident when one considers the amount of speeches since that time highlighting the need to protect the special rights of the bumiputera as opposed to those that talk of safeguarding "the legitimate interests of the other communities". However, any talk of a "post-1969 social contract" is misleading as there was no fundamental redistribution of rights under the Constitution. The question now becomes whether the Federal Constitution is fluid enough to reflect the evolution of society and, in particular, desires for a more inclusive expression of what is meant by bangsa Malaysia. (63) One possible avenue to explore then is the notion that a change in the discourse surrounding conceptions of national identity is required in order to account for the evolution of the social and political landscape in contemporary Malaysia. As the respected jurist, Datuk P.G. Lim observed: "If we were to refer to ourselves as citizens or rakyat of Malaysia, this would remove much of the obfuscations that cloud our vision to establish a sense of belonging and nationhood among all citizens on a national level irrespective of race or ethnicity." (64) Contained within such visions is the emergence of a genuine popular national culture that could then, according to Gramsci, provide the foundation for the formation of "a popular collective will" which, in turn, would yield the basis for a new hegemonic project.
While such scenarios point to the very real possibility of transformation in the socio-political terrain of Malaysia, a closer reading of Gramsci cautions us against any naive or overly idealistic interpretation of "political moments" such as the 2008 general elections. On the surface, the election results do appear to confirm the existence of the homogeneity and organization necessary in civil society to ensure the operation of just such a "collective will", something that was apparently lacking in 1999. What Gramsci reminds us, however, is that even an extraordinary degree of organic unity does not guarantee the outcome of a specific struggle. Hegemony, in his conception, is a historically specific and temporary moment in the life of a society. Again, there is nothing automatic about hegemony; it has to be actively constructed and positively maintained. Moreover, Gramsci urges us to take note of the multi-dimensional and multi-arena character of hegemony--that it, "represents the installation of a profound measure of social and moral authority, not simply over its immediate supporters but across society as a whole". (65) Two potential pitfalls loom large in this regard. The first is that the PR coalition members must transcend their ideological differences otherwise it could be a case of "back to the future" and a trouncing at the next elections, just as 2004 followed 1999. In this sense, coalition-building must recognize that diversity in a plural society is more than a virtue: it is a necessity that invents social and political experiments. Opposition elements must think strategically and avoid narrow party interests while cultivating an open dialogue on issues previously deemed too sensitive such as ethnicity and religion. This means escaping the culture of insiderism and creating new shapes of political representation that lie outside those hitherto conventional structures. So far, the PR seems to holding fast, but it is uncertain how the added responsibility of governing at the state level and of operating as a viable opposition at the federal level will affect its bonds. Secondly, in its current incarnation the BN coalition remains communal in nature. While the ruling coalition does have to contend with demands for non-communal politics from both the urban middle class and non-bumiputera poor, it is entirely plausible that UMNO, in an attempt to reinforce its legitimacy as a Malay-based party, pursues race-based policies in order to resolve intra-bumiputera class cleavages and mobilize rural Malay support. After all, the relatively small Malay swing against the BN in 2008 suggests that UMNO could well regain control of the Malay heartland states and an increased majority in parliament if it addresses such communal economic needs. (66) This would only "serve to foreclose other forms of political identification, such as 'ketuanan rakyat' (people supremacy) that the opposition is trying to promote". (67) At the present moment, it is therefore premature to say definitively what shape any future hegemonic settlement in Malaysia will adopt.
Conclusion
It should be emphasized that reading the 2008 Malaysian general election through Gramsci is not intended to provide a definitive interpretation. Rather, it is a matter of bringing a distinctive theoretical perspective to bear on the analytical issues that such historical moments throw up. The strength of a Gramscian conceptual framework lies in its emphasis on the complex operation of hegemony and the critical role that popular consent plays within any successful hegemonic project. The fundamental role accorded to civil society as the primary site for the manufacture of (and challenge to) consent highlights not only the need to focus on ideological leadership but also implies that as the terrain of civil society shifts, so too must the ideological tack of the ruling stratum if it wishes to maintain its hegemony. While such a conceptual framework is unable to authoritatively determine the exact socio-political path the country will tread, such a nuanced analysis gives greater shape to the horizon of possibilities by examining the complex operation of hegemony and legitimacy in Malaysia over the past decade. The belief that the 2008 general elections herald something qualitatively different in contemporary Malaysia finds support in Gramsci's distinction between East and West and the historical transition from one to the other which he describes. In this sense, it is conceivable that civil society in Malaysia is no longer "primordial and gelatinous" but is instead a much more sturdy structure, one that the opposition forces are now in a better position to take advantage of and fulfil the potential of Reformasi. Gramsci's description of the West, "with its mass democratic forms, its complex civil society, the consolidation of the consent of the masses, through political democracy" (68) no longer seems out of place in a country like Malaysia and this translates into a more consensual basis for the state. At the very least, this is something that all sides now need to account for in contemporary Malaysia.
NOTES
(1) A slightly different version of this article was presented at the 15th Malaysia and Singapore Society Colloquium held at the Australian National University, 5-6 December 2008. The author would like to express his gratitude to the organizers and participants of the colloquium as well as to the faculty and students of the Department of International Relations at the ANU for their insightful feedback. Particular thanks must go to the two anonymous reviewers for their perceptive comments and advice.
(2) "Malaysia's Election: Political Tsunami?", Economist, 10 March 2008.
(3) Although a broad coalition, the main players within the BN are the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).
(4) The discursive significance of this new coalition should not be underestimated. Here the PR presents itself clearly as a potential government and not simply a foil to the ruling BN coalition.
(5) Such a perspective has precedence in the literature on Malaysia. See, Fatimah Halim, "The Transformation of the Malaysian State", Journal of Contemporary Asia 20, no. 1 (1990): 64-81 and P. Ramasamy, "Civil Society in Malaysia: An Arena for Contestation?", in Civil Society in Southeast Asia, edited by Lee Hock Guan (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), pp. 198-216. For two particularly insightful book-length analyses of recent political events in Malaysia employing a Gramscian perspective see, Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and its Discontents (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2003) and John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2001).
(6) Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 61.
(7) Steve Jones, Antonio Gramsci (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 41.
(8) Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), p. 182.
(9) Stuart Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", in Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, edited by David Morely and Chen Kuan-Hsing (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 439.
(10) Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1982), p. 42.
(11) Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Cultural Writings (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1985), p. 102.
(12) Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance", op. cit., p. 431.
(13) Ramasamy, "Civil Society in Malaysia", op. cit., p. 198.
(14) Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones, "Marxist Theories of International Relations", in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 3rd ed., edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 235.
(15) Ramasamy, "Civil Society in Malaysia", op. cit., p. 210.
(16) Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance", op. cit., pp. 428-29.
(17) Ibid., p. 422.
(18) Ibid., p. 423.
(19) Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, op. cit., p. 210.
(20) Jones, Antonio Gramsci, op. cit., pp. 95-97; Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
(21) Gramsci, "Selections from the Prison Notebooks", op. cit., p. 178.
(22) Ibid., p. 184. For more on the term social formation see Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance", op. cit., pp. 420-21.
(23) Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance", op. cit., p. 421.
(24) For a perceptive enquiry into the changing nature of legitimation and the development of hegemony through the 1990s see Khoo, Beyond Mahathir, op. cit., pp. 17-37 and Hilley, Malaysia, op. cit., pp. 1-46.
(25) For a detail synopsis of this conjunction see, Khoo, Beyond Mahathir, op. cit., pp. 17-20.
(26) Khoo, Beyond Mahathir, op. cit., p. 107.
(27) Ibid., p. 112. The BA comprised of KeADILan, PAS, the DAP and Partai Rakyat Malaysia.
(28) For an example of the former opinion, see Hari Singh, "Opposition Politics and the 1999 Malaysian Election", in Trends in Malaysia: Election Assessment (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 33. For the latter opinion, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "The 1999 General Elections: A Preliminary Overview", in Trends in Malaysia: Election Assessment (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 1.
(29) UMNO's number of parliamentary seats declined from 94 to 72 and for the first time its total number of seats was less than that of its coalition partners; four ministers and five deputy ministers lost their seats. See John Funston, "Malaysia's Elections: Malay Winds of Change?", in Trends in Malaysia: Election Assessment (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 51. Also, Khoo, Beyond Mahathir, op. cit., pp. 112-21 and Hilley, Malaysia, op. cit., pp. 262-67.
(30) Ahmad, "The 1999 General Elections", op. cit., p. 5. See also, Funston, "Malaysia's Elections", op. cit., p. 51.
(31) Khoo, Beyond Mahathir, op. cit., p. 122.
(32) Abroad, "The 1999 General Elections", op. cit., p. 7.
(33) Khoo, Beyond Mahathir, op. cit., p. 121.
(34) See Joseph Liow, "The Politics Behind Malaysia's Eleventh General Election", Asian Survey 45, no. 6 (2005): 907 and Bridget Welsh, "Malaysia in 2004: Out of Mahthir's Shadow?", Asian Survey 45, no. 1 (2005): 154.
(35) Hilley, Malaysia, op. cit., p. 13 (emphasis in the original).
(36) Ibid., p. 268.
(37) Welsh, "Malaysia in 2004", op. cit., p. 154.
(38) Khoo, Beyond Mahathir, op. cit., p. 123.
(39) Hilley, Malaysia, op. cit., p. 263.
(40) Liow, "Malaysia's Eleventh General Election", op. cit., p. 929.
(41) Edmund Terrence Gomez, "UMNO Still Strong in Malay Heartland", Malaysialdni, 4 June 2008
(42) The most famous example of this is the New Economic Policy (NEP), implemented in the wake of the ethnic riots of 1969, which had the stated goal of poverty eradication and economic restructuring so as to eliminate the identification of ethnicity with economic function. This was to be achieved through affirmative action in favour of the bumiputera (literally, princes of the soil)--Malays and other "indigenous" citizens of Malaysia. Although it officially ended in 1990, much of the tangible benefits it offers to the bumiputera are still in effect and it is still referred to in the present tense by many Malaysians. I will use this term to indicate the NEP and any of the subsequent "NEP-like" programmes.
(43) Gomez, "UMNO Still Strong", op. cit.
(44) Ibid.
(45) In fact, the BN coalition garnered just 49.8 per cent of the votes cast on the peninsular and just over half of the parliamentary seats on offer (85 out of 165). See Edmund Terence Gomez, "Jockeying for Power in the New Malaysia", Far Eastern Economic Review (July/August 2008): 30-34 and Ong Kian Ming, "Making Sense of the Political Tsunami", Malaysiakini, 11 March 2008
(46) Ong, "Making Sense", op. cit.
(47) "Making Sense of the 2008 General Election Results", Malaysia Votes, 9 March 2008
(48) Ong, "Making Sense", op. cit.
(49) "Making Sense of the 2008 General Election Results", op. cit.
(50) So far, nothing has come of the talks. See, Beh Lih Yi, "PAS: No to Cooperation, Yes to Meetings", Malaysiakini, 31 July 2008
(51) Ooi Kee Beng, "Bangsa Malaysia: Vision or Spin?", in Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges, edited by Saw Swee-Hock and K. Kesavapany (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 47-72.
(52) "Public Opinion Poll on Ethnic Relations--Ethnic Relations: Experience, Perception and Expectations", Merdeka Center for Opinion Research
(53) Colum Murphy, "Anwar Liberates Malaysian Politics", Far Eastern Economic Review (September 2008): 10. It should be noted, however, that after the 1999 elections, Musa Hitam, himself a prominent UMNO "old hand" warned party members that UMNO had to rejuvenate itself. Musa's advice went unheeded by party leaders, in particular, Mahathir. See Khoo, Beyond Mahathir, op. cit., pp. 129-30.
(54) Among the races, the Malay suffers the greatest income disparity with the Gini coefficient within the Malay community increasing from 0.428 in 1990 to 0.4495 in 1997. Hence the income gap between the upper and lower strata of the bumiputera has become more pronounced over time. Criticism here centres on the economic advantages that political connections offer with some commentators even referring to "UMNO-puteras" rather than "bumiputeras". See, K.J. Ratnam, "Forging a New National Consensus--Towards a Malaysian Development Agenda", Centre for Public Policy Studies
(55) Nash Rahman and Chan Kok Leong, "Zaid: Stop Pitting Malays Against Non Malays", Malaysiakini, 14 March 2008
(56) See, Shannon Teoh, "Poll Shows Most Malaysians Want NEP to End", Malaysian Insider, 9 October 2008
(57) "Najib Ready to End Special Privileges for the Malays", Malaysian Insider, 24 October 2008
(58) Ibid.
(59) Abdul Aziz Bari and Farid Sufian Shuaib, Constitution of Malaysia: Text and Commentary (Petaling Jaya: Prentice Hall, 2004), p. 328.
(60) The commission was comprised of five foreign (Commonwealth) constitutional experts.
(61) In Bari and Shuaib, Constitution of Malaysia, op. cit., p. 332.
(62) Ibid., p. 333.
(63) See K.J. John, "Integration with Integrity: The Identity Crisis (Pt. 5)", Malaysiakini, 22 May 2007
(64) In Dato' Dr Ismail Noor, "Building a Bangsa Malaysia--Challenges & Issues", Centre for Public Policy Studies
(65) Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance", op. cit., p. 424 (emphasis added).
(66) Gomez, "UMNO Still Strong", op. cit.
(67) Ibid. This does not mean that the meaning and composition of the 'rakyat' or 'people' remains uncontested. However, use of the term does at least imply a more ethnically-neutral and inclusive basis for legitimate authority in Malaysia.
(68) Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance", op. cit., p. 427.
MICHAEL O'SHANNASSY is a doctoral candidate in the Department of International Relations, the Australian National University (ANU), Canberra.
Constructing an Islamic model in two Malaysian states: PAS rule in Kelantan and Terengganu.
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Since the fall of communism a new world order is emerging in which political Islam develops into one of the major players: Islam not only provides a new stimuli for the re-definition of political models as well as social and cultural identity but also constitutes a crucial part of globalization as one of its most outspoken critics. It does the latter by highlighting the uneven development inherent in Western concepts and challenging the social/moral impetus of a largely growth-oriented approach to capitalism. At the same time, Islam tries to present alternative social and cultural models that arise from its own perception of an all-compassing belief-system that in practice is heavily fragmented along social and cultural lines. The particularistic answers arising from various Islamic backgrounds, however, emerge from an increasingly global setting of policy-making that is similarly multi-faceted. In the case of Malaysia, these ambiguities of modernization have become more focused than in many other Islamic countries. As one of the most outstanding examples of rapid development, Malaysia provides a showcase of how a society can undergo both political and cultural change while trying to construct a non-Western modernity centring on Asian and specifically Islamic traditions and values. At the same time its political system provides for a relatively higher level of participation, at least compared with many other Islamic countries, thus enabling opposition parties to come up with alternative social models.
In this context, the Islamic Pard Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) provides an interesting example with its attempt at constructing and enforcing a system of "Islamic democracy" in the two east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu. PAS has governed these states since 1990 and 1999 respectively. Islamic governance in these states will be examined politically, economically, and socially by assessing PAS' background and development. It will be asked how PAS' Islamic administration differs from the Islamic mainstream policies proposed by the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) (1) coalition and to what extent PAS is hampered by constitutional as well as political considerations in a multi-ethnic society.
Paradigm Shift within PAS
>From Nationalism to Islamic State
Burhanuddin al-Helmy, the founder of PAS, had already in the 1960s explicitly voiced the dilemma in which his party had been caught by incorporating two positions into its political programme that are hardly compatible: representing Malay nationalist interests while at the same time defending universal Islamic principles (Burhanuddin al-Helmy 1964). Unlike UMNO, the leading nationalist Malay party in the ruling BN, PAS has always defined itself through Islam and has therefore been in a permanent conflict between nationalism--condemned as assabiyah by Islamists (2)--and the universality of a religion defining itself by the total submission to divine principles. With the emergence of the dakwah movement in the late 1970s--the call to go back to the "roots" of Islam--and an ensuing Islamization of the public sphere, the nationalist-Islamic ambiguity has become even more apparent and has led to frictions within the party. Resistance particularly emerged after PAS joined the ruling coalition in 1974, which was seen as a betrayal of the Islamic cause by the ulama in the party who opposed the rather nationalist-inclined leadership under Mohamad Asri.
Its failure to function as a component within the BN government in late 1977 considerably changed the profile of PAS. Leaving nationalist Malay politics behind, the party openly confessed its Islamic identity. Several steps were taken to "Islamize" the outlook of the party: through establishing a Majlis Shura as the highest decision-making body within the party, the religious leadership of the ulama was secured. At the same time the PAS General Assembly in October 1982 decided to limit the influence of the party president in favour of the Islamic principle of musyawarah, which is based on common consensus (Pushpa 1984, pp. 205-28). The position of the more secular-oriented leadership of Mohammad Asri was further undermined by the results of the April 1982 general election and the failure of PAS to attract non-Muslim voters. The newly elected leadership of Haji Yusuf Rawa and Fadzil Noor favoured the Iranian model of an Islamic state and suggested it as a viable political alternative for Malaysia. The implications of an Islamic government led by ulama, however, brought PAS into serious conflict with local traditions, which, among others, consider the sultan as the main representative and protector of Islam and Malay customs (adat), a perception rejected by Islamic fundamentalism as contradicting the principles of the shari'a. Islamic initiatives of this kind having been announced with great fanfare, often led to PAS backtracking soon after in view of the realities of the Malaysian politics. The country's political system does not provide for constitutional principles such as the position of the rulers, to be questioned or changed easily. Thus, the political game of using Islamic issues often turned into a farce, such as during the so-called kafir-mengafir exchanges between PAS and UMNO in 1984 when both accused each other of being un-Islamic. At the core of this debate was the mainly populist attempt by both parties to rally the conservative Malay working class mostly in the rural areas to its side. For both UMNO and PAS, playing the Islamic card did not succeed in the long run. It deprived PAS of the support of the non-Malay populace whom it tried to win over from the 1980s. However, since PAS did not have the support of the non-Malay populace in the first place, it was UMNO that risked losing more by alienating its non-Malay voters and coalition partners with a more Islam-based agenda. To counter this strategic weakness, PAS started to woo the Chinese minority in 1985 by arguing that Islamic universalism could actually supersede the narrow nationalism of UMNO. Nevertheless, PAS was not able to attract large numbers of the non-Muslim electorate, even by stressing the rights minorities had enjoyed during early Islam because in the final analysis, PAS failed to produce a social contract that would suit the present condition of Malaysian society (Stark 1999, pp. 63-70).
Starting with the PAS General Assembly in 1989, the party has gradually adapted to the political realities in Malaysia. The only way to gain access to power could be by pursuing a universalistic approach in a more realistic attempt to carry out fundamentalist policies in a multiethnic society.
By winning the elections in Kelantan in 1990s, however, PAS could afford to take a more uncompromising line again. As the leading party in the newly emerging Islamic opposition alliance Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU), (3) PAS had to shape an even more decisively Islamic profile to counter Mahathir's Islamic policies, which had been proceeding on a largely symbolic scale since 1981. (4) The announcement to introduce the Islamic penal code in Kelantan (hudud) again showed the disproportion between PAS' political aspirations and its feasibility in a secular state, which only used Islam for legitimacy purposes. Therefore, the hudud debate has been a watershed in the Islamic policies pursued by PAS. Even though religious laws are under the jurisdiction of the states, the federal government possesses various tools to bring non-conformist state governments into line, such as the delay or blocking of official funds or the domination of the legislative bodies, through which it can exercise control. (5)
As a whole, after shifting its focus from nationalist to Islamic policies in the late 1970s, PAS had not been able to define what its aims really were and how it intended to achieve them. It could neither clarify how an Islamic state based on the shi'a principles of governance--for example, the dominant position of the Islamic clergy--could be established in a sunni-dominated state such as Malaysia, where strong pre-Islamic traditions of governance and equally strong non-Islamic cultural identity hamper any attempt to establish orthodox Islamic rule. While PAS has accused UMNO on numerous occasions of introducing merely symbolic Islamization policies with a populist motive, it remains unclear how far Islamization should go to satisfy the PAS ulama. Until the leadership change in 1995 and much more since the Anwar affair in 1998, which finally provided PAS with the necessary arguments to turn its back on the traditionalisms of the Islamic state-ideology, PAS had not been able to react flexibly to social-political developments in Malaysian society. (6) By insisting on the Qur'anic principles of an Islamic state and an orientation towards a political system that is deeply rooted in the past, PAS has provided its political adversaries with a lot of easy ammunition. Compared with Al-Arqam, which was quickly banned in 1994 by the UMNO government on allegations that it was a deviationist movement, PAS did not make any effort to reconstruct Islam in the sense of a specific "Islamic modernity" that had been calling for the Islamization of modern science and technology (Tibi 1992). (7) PAS had been too preoccupied with rejecting UMNO's concept of a moderate secular-oriented approach to Islamic modernity in a highly politicized contest of defining Malay-Muslim identity and consequently missed out on the debate over a "third way" of modernization that had been ongoing among Malaysian intellectuals since the 1980s. Mainly focusing on a new approach towards the Islamization of the social sciences and literature, debates such as between Kassim Ahmad and Shahnon Ahmad (1982-84) and Mohammad Affandi Hassan and Muhammad Haji Salleh (1993-94) emerged against a background of a much wider debate on the Islamization of thought as a distinctive frame of reference (almarji'iyya al-Islamiyya) in the Islamic world, represented by Islamic thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal and Sayyid Qutb.
In the Malaysian debate on Islam, the traditionalist terminology of PAS was matched by a similarly inflexible attitude of the ruling BN coalition. Basically, this was a political competition for power and domination. The articulation of dissent against the UMNO-led government, often formulated in Islamic terms, was met with authoritarian responses once it did not conform to the official concept of modernization. (8) Islamic policies remained the domain of the state as a programme of cultural orientation to serve economic development. However, the fervour of catching up with developed nations, as laid out in Mahathir's Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020), has further aroused dissenting opinions. (9) The case of Anwar Ibrahim's arrest further exposed the authoritarian nature of Mahathir's administration that had managed to use Islam, modernization, and Malay cultures to gain popular support. The late 1990s witnessed the departure from conventional political perceptions of PAS as the "Islamic traditionalists" and UMNO as the "protector of Malay interests" (Muzaffar 1992, pp. 89-215) but the events of September 11 have again resulted in PAS turning back to its conservative roots. While backing the Taliban in Afghanistan and announcing the introduction of hudud style capital punishment in Terengganu, PAS has failed to consider the swing in public opinion after September 11. This has made it easy for UMNO to accuse PAS of having "terrorist connections" and to question the sincerity of PAS' 1999 campaign for a liberal Islamic civil society. In response, PAS has reverted to its conservative Islamic state discourse and by doing so, has alienated its remaining partner in the Barisan Alternatif (BA), KeADILan, as well as the majority of non-Muslim voters. (10) By insisting on the implementation of the shari'a, PAS could hope to question the Islamic credentials of the government, which it had already accused in the early 1980s of merely "cosmetic" policies in its attempt to Islamize the country. Furthermore, after the numerous political scandals of the 1980s and 1990s PAS could use the hudud argument to highlight the failure of secular governance and the need to replace it with an Islamic one. (11)
>From Islamic State to Islamic Democracy
Considering the overwhelming victory of the ruling coalition in the general elections of 1995, PAS had to acknowledge that Mahathir's approach towards a moderate Islam in a modernized, open, and mainly secular society enjoyed considerable backing among Malaysians. So far, despite frantic efforts to prove UMNO's approach wrong, PAS had been on the losing end, being relegated to a peripheral role in Malaysian politics. The opposition front APU (see endnote 3) had largely failed because of PAS' uncompromising stand on establishing an Islamic state that was unacceptable to non-Muslim voters. While Islam as a strong force of cultural identification had helped a new Malay middle class to shape their own urban identities, the divide between rich "Umnoputras" and less fortunate rural Malays had grown bigger in the 1990s. So it was not so much Islam as a religious/cultural system, which had already been successfully explored as a "vote-puller" by UMNO, but its social/ philosophical aspects, which could provide PAS with new opportunities of Islamic discourse by linking it to the evolving wider framework of "Islamic democracy" and its main characteristics such as "clean governance", "moral values", and the rejection of "crony capitalism" discussed above. The general shift among Islamic fundamentalists towards a more democratic, participatory approach in the 1990s (Ghadbian 1997, pp. 87-116) (12) has contributed to PAS rethinking its own position on Malaysian politics. But the crucial stimulus came from within the country. Returning to its criticisms made in the 1980s of corruption, social injustice, and suppression, PAS started to move away from its previous fundamentalist image to advocate Islamic moderation, clean governance, reliability, and transparency in contrast to what it perceived as a despotic regime of the "Firaun" (Pharaoh) Mahathir (Hj. Fadzil Md. Noor 2000, p. 17). By embracing the goal to establish a just and democratic Islamic society without the "money politics" of UMNO, the new PAS leadership received an enormous boost to its credibility and popularity. Also, more than any political event before, the sacking of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and his treatment during the court proceedings gave PAS the strong symbol it needed to turn its quest for a more transparent democratic approach into a mass movement; a movement that addressed a growing demand for more social justice and participation and for less restriction and patronage as Malaysia entered the "global village". To this end, UMNO has provided PAS with the arguments it needed to portray itself as the political alternative using the same Islamic principles that UMNO had appropriated for the latter's economic-centric cause. The new Islamic concept of PAS, like that of UMNO, projects Islam as a modernizing force, which is capable of instilling such positive values as work ethics, diligence, and compassion in a fast-changing society, as stipulated in Wawasan 2020. In fact, PAS' answer to Mahathir's Vision 2020 was the so-called Wawasan Akhirat, which accentuated the human aspect of what both PAS and Mahathir have dubbed the "caring society" (Masyarakat Penyayang) (Manifesto Pilihanraya 1990; Mahathir Mohamad 1991). Both parties are caught in a similar dilemma now: While UMNO has to maintain a moderate approach to Islam, also by incorporating "Asian values" and common virtues in it to satisfy its non-Muslim coalition partners in the National Front, PAS has realized that only the same multi-ethnic approach can enable it to gain political power in the foreseeable future (thus the move from the radical "Islamic state" towards the more moderate "Islamic civil society") (Hj. Fadzil Md. Noor 2000, p. 22) (13) The democratic facelift of PAS' Islam since 1995 is tailored exactly to fit into the multi-ethnic composition of Malaysian society and aims mainly at luring the Chinese to vote for the BA coalition front, which was set up in 1999. PAS' declared intention to give equal rights to all citizens, promote transparency in government and abolish crony capitalism based on group interests, is a bid to re-establish the social contract between a future PAS-led government and two constituencies the party wants to woo. They are the lower-income classes of the Malays (burniputera) who have lost out to the well-connected burniputera-entrepreneurs, as well as the non-Malays who see their economic domain encroached upon by this same class of privileged burniputera.
While UMNO has focused on the modernizing aspects of Islam, PAS managed to be one step ahead by using the "Islamic democracy" argument to accuse the government of mismanagement, corruption, and dictatorial practices (Hj. Fadzil Md. Noor 2000, pp. 29-34). Since these accusations contained a certain amount of truth and were a perception shared by a large number of Malays in the 1999 general election, UMNO could not just shrug it off with a business-as-usual attitude. To this end, PAS had temporarily gained an advantage in defining the terms of debate. After the split of the BA in September 2001 over PAS' uncompromising stand on the "Islamic state" issue, it may be argued that PAS has failed politically: The way PAS is ruling the two east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu since 1990 and 1999, respectively, provides us with some insights into PAS' political, economic, and social programme and its potential for reform.
Ruling Kelantan
Aspects of Political Governance
Immediately before the general election in October 1990, PAS formed the opposition front APU. Both APU and Gagasan Rakyat were the first attempts to achieve a common election platform among the opposition parties (see endnote 3). Islam, despite its universal bearings, which PAS always tried to put forward since the 1980s, however, was not able to provide the same unifying appeal as the strong integrative symbols of "modernization" and "development" did for BN. As such, the opposition front was not able to challenge seriously the government's ideology of rapid growth. Worse yet, PAS' insistence on establishing an Islamic state further alienated non-Muslim Chinese voters. Differences over the Islamic state concept were also the main reason for Gagasan Rakyat to break up in late 1996.
PAS with the help of Semangat 46 captured Kelantan from the BN in October 1990. In governing the state, the party had to negotiate various obstacles that stood in its way to establish an Islamic government based on the shari'a. In the long run, it could not introduce policies that were not supported by the majority of non-Malays or the more secularized urban Malay middle-class voters. The 1993 hudud controversy underlined another check on PAS prerogative as a state government. PAS also could not rule against the federal constitution and the federal government, nor could it risk being cut off from government funds if it openly defied the Malaysian political structure.
Politically, PAS soon found itself in a similar situation as the government when it came to the implementation of Islam: bound by constitutional and multiracial predicaments, PAS had to abide by the same standards as Mahathir whom it had often criticized for introducing Islamic symbols into politics without thoroughly changing the system. The degree of Islamization in Kelantan is significant because it provides an example for Islam being a viable alternative to Western models of governance. Immediately after taking over the government in Kelantan, PAS introduced the programme Membangun Bersama Islam (Developing Together with Islam) as an attempt to strengthen the role of Islam both in politics and in economics (Hi. Mohamad Daud et al. 2000, pp. 119-20). Based on the three principles itqaan (ability), ubudiah (submission), and mas'uliah (responsibility), it intends to implement the shari'a as an alternative socio-economic model which replaces the capitalist system with a more balanced approach giving priority to the role of man in a more spiritual and just society. In its attempt to find an alternative to the destructive forces of capitalism and Western democracy, PAS policies end up sharing many similarities with Mahathir's Vision 2020. While PAS speaks of the necessity to replace the individualistic and hedonistic aspects of capitalism with the spirituality of Islam, Mahathir has focused on the so-called Asian values as a means of social engineering to avoid the social ills of rapid development (Mahathir Mohamad 1999, pp. 79-92).
Despite the conceptual similarities between the programmes of UMNO and PAS, there were important differences in implementation. The introduction of a new, more Islamic administration at the end of 1990 provided PAS with the necessary appeal to gather the rural, mostly conservative Malay electorate behind a programme, which largely intended to show the differences between the lavishness of the urban corporate society of "Umnoputras" and the humble and unassuming simplicity of the chief minister, Menteri Besar Nik Aziz Nik Mat. As a first step, cuts in the expenditure of government officials were introduced and these officials agreed to contribute 20 per cent of their allowances to a state welfare fund, the Tabung Kewangan Negeri (Mohammad Agus Yusoff 1991, p. 103). Nik Aziz announced that he would forsake his housing allowance of RM3,000 (approximately US$400) per month, since he stayed in his own house. Other cuts were made in the spending on public functions such as during the end of the Islamic fasting month, which is traditionally celebrated in grandiose style. By rejecting the extravagance of the huge gatherings held during "open house" receptions of national leaders in Kuala Lumpur, PAS conveyed two messages: it stressed the principle of moderation, which is a tenet held strongly by Islam; and it rejected elements of Malay traditionalism and culture that serve as an important cultural marker for UMNO. The characteristics of an Islamic leader being incorruptible and humble as apparent in the simple lifestyles of Nik Aziz provided PAS with the sought-after credibility in setting up a visibly new approach towards Islamic governance.
More symbolic in nature and subtly underlining the specific Islamic nature of its approach despite the constitutional limitations, PAS introduced several changes in the public sphere soon after. A guideline was set up to identify suitable male and female dresses for sports activities in order to create "Islamic sports" and the Kelantan football team was consequently equipped with the newly designed outfits, featuring long sleeves and trousers, which covered all body parts (Mohammad Agus Yusoff 1991, p. 106). Women were banned from participating in Qur'an reading competitions in the Kelantan state capital of Kota Bharu on the grounds that women's voices were part of their aurat and consequently could not be exposed in public, When compared with Mahathir's "Islamic toilet" installed in the Prime Minister's Department and the Putra World Trade Centre, Kuala Lumpur in 1984, these PAS tactics show how similar, even exchangeable, they were to the UMNO attempts at Islamization. At the heart of these manoeuvres by both sides to introduce Islam into the public sphere is a political motive to strengthen their respective legitimacy of "modernization" without "Westernization".
Similar to Bank Islam, introduced by Mahathir in 1983 and operating according to Islamic principles, which forbid the paying of interest (riba), PAS established an Islamic welfare fund, Tabung Serambi Mekah, to collect donations from the public to be used in rural development projects Both schemes shared a commercial function in paying returns on savings as shared benefits even though, strictly speaking, this is not acceptable in Islam. As Nik Aziz Nik Mat stated while launching the project, this scheme would provide the public with the opportunity to scrutinize closely how his government was taking steps to ensure the well-being of society as a whole (Nik Aziz Nik Mat 1991). PAS' criticism of the uneven development within Malaysian society, which--as a consequence of the UMNO government's New Economic Policy (NEP)--had resulted in the split-up of the Malay community into a class of well-connected corporate people (the Melayu baru, or New Malay) and the rural poor dating back to the 1980s. However, as much as PAS has been critical of UMNO's economic model, its own kind of Islamic financial system cannot run away from the basic principles of having to rely on "investments" and to provide "returns" on the investments.
The Asian crisis emerging in the late 1990s provided PAS with the political opportunities to highlight the shortcomings of economic development under UMNO. The slowdown of the economy and the handling of the Anwar affair allowed PAS to campaign for more transparency, citizens' participation, and human rights in the general elections of November 1999. Some of the demands of the BA to abolish such draconian laws as the Internal Security Act again illustrated the limits to opposition campaign because the ruling BN with its two-thirds majority in the federal Parliament can block any initiative by the opposition (Manifesto Bersama Barisan Alternatif 1999, pp. 22-24). As was made evident when the hudud debate in 1993 led to PAS shelving its plans to introduce Islamic criminal punishment in Kelantan, all moves requiring the consent of the federal government are bound to fail, thus leaving a very limited space for political manoeuverability. It may be that this obstacle has prompted the Kelantan PAS government to resort to prayers as a last spiritual remedy. It introduced solat hajat (prayer of intention) as a main feature of Islamic administration to address all kinds of political and social ills. This had widespread support. Solar hajat, involving the top level of the Kelantan government and joined by thousands of believers in Kota Bharu, was performed to counter the UMNO assemblies in 1993 and 1995. It was also performed during the 1995 general election, the 1999 Terengganu oil royalty crisis, and on various other occasions (Dinsman 2000, pp. 63-76).
The political agenda of the PAS government in Kelantan has not provided any tangible instance of thorough Islamization in the last ten years. Its introduction of the decision-making body, the Majlis Shura, as a feature of Islamic governance has not changed the government structure. Neither has it introduced Islamic jurisdiction on a larger scale. It remains on a mainly symbolic level of Islamic appeal, bearing striking resemblance with UMNO's Islamic policies in the 1980s and 1990s. PAS's initiatives in the cultural sphere sometimes place it in a dilemma of not living up to its model of a civil society based on equal rights and opportunities for all communities and races as the hallmark of the Islamic democratic principle of khilafat. For example, in its bid to woo the non-Muslim Chinese community by not interfering with their right to practise their traditions and culture, PAS is seen to be discriminating against its own Malay-Muslim constituents by allowing only Malay tradition from the Islamic period and banning folk beliefs and customs from pre-Islamic time. While the rights of women have been extended by introducing the five-day working week to curb the exploitation of female factory workers, women's active participation in society according to PAS' views stops short of the much more far-reaching demands for gender equality made by the women's rights group Sisters in Islam. While hudud is promoted by PAS as a vital means to establish inter-ethnic, inter-religious solidarity and equality through the application of Islamic jurisdiction for all, it has to reassure the non-Muslims that they will be excluded from it in the mean time to disperse their fears of an Islamic state.
Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia is less restrictive than in some Muslim countries because it has to abide by constitutional rules that provide checks and balances. PAS' aim to establish a democratic and fair society based on Islamic principles is reduced to mere compromises as long as the legal framework of the federation cannot be changed by PAS and its political allies through a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Since this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future, PAS' move to turn from the concept of an Islamic state to the one of an Islamic civil society is only the consequence of acknowledging political realities and the need to introduce Islamic rule of law in a more watered-down, compromising form.
In the long run, the emergence of a two-party-system in Malaysia would certainly put more pressure on PAS in terms of political competition to moderate its approach towards Islam, both to accommodate demands from within the BA as well as from non-Muslim voters. Since Islam is a strong pillar of Malay identity and part of Malay politics, a future model of Malaysian democracy will probably evolve around the competition of ideas, the opening-up towards political opposition, more political transparency, and chances to effectively control and evaluate politicians for the rakyat while still retaining a strong reference to Islam. This would not so much be an "alternative model" of governance, but rather a form of Asian democracy that incorporates both Western and Eastern values as Mahathir and PAS leaders have repeatedly stressed.
Economic implications
Kelantan has chosen a new approach to economics, which is based on the Islamic principles of collective benefit (maslaha), stipulating equal opportunities for all, avoiding monopolies and the consequent accumulation of power in the hands of a few, as well as framing capitalism in religious values to avoid the negative aspects of rapid development. One of the important pillars of "Islamic economics" is the belief that development should be in line with the spiritual needs of man, establishing a balance between material and non-material progress and rejecting "growth without limits". In his speech on the national budget in the Kuala Lumpur Parliament in October 2000, the chairman of PAS, Haji Fadzil Mohd. Noor, outlined PAS' economic perspective in contrast to that the ruling BN (Hj. Fadzil Md. Noor 2001). It calls for support for small and medium enterprises, creation of jobs by encouraging local companies to reinvest their profits in domestic development projects, the restriction of capital flow abroad by international conglomerates, which does not benefit the local job market, and the abolishment of preferential business relations between government and corporate leaders as a result of uneven development under the NEP. PAS' critique of the government's economic policies stems from the immediate consequences of these policies, which had initially been intended to improve the economic opportunities for the Malays and increase their stake in the public and private sectors. According to PAS, the emergence of the Melayu baru class of corporate leaders has contributed to an increasingly uneven distribution of wealth, providing a few with access to political and economic decision-making structures and denying it to the majority. PAS has criticized this so-called 3k economy (korupsi, kolusi, and kroni) and its role in the privatization programme of the government as too close an intermingling of political and economic interests: in short, as capitalism in its purest form (kapitalis totok) (Hj. Fadzil Md. Noor 2000, pp. 16-17).
As a result, the PAS government in Kelantan has tried to subject economic growth to the check and balance of a civil society (mujtama' almadani) under the overarching principle of Islam as an all-comprising lifestyle (syumul). To enact its belief, PAS has set up two supervisory bodies, the Perbadanan Iktisad Negeri Kelantan (PKINK) and the Yayasan Kelantan Darulnaim (YAKIN) (Hj. Mohamad Daud 2000, p. 124). These institutions function according to PAS' strategic economic planning, which was submitted to the federal government's Economic Planning Committee (Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara) in 1990. Just as PAS believe that principles of Islamic governance have to be traced back to the scriptures of Qur'an and hadith, it also derives its socio-economic outlook from these sources. The three main responsibilities of an Islamic government--religious guidance, redistributing zakat (Islamic alms tax), and avoiding evil deeds (amar Maruf dan nahi Mungkar)--revolve around its attitude towards the individual, underlining the importance of personal achievement and thriving in Islam, linking progress and religion in a Weberian sense. PAS states one of the five pillars of Islam, giving zakat, as the reason for an Islamically inclined administration to equally distribute the benefits of economic activity among the poor (fakir), since only the preferential treatment of socially and economically marginalized groups ensures the future advancement of the society as a whole.
The model character of a government, which portrays itself according to moral standards set down in the Qur'an and expects similar behaviours from its citizens in return, can only be upheld in the longer run, if abuse of power, authoritarian tendencies, and corrupt practices can be avoided. Since PAS has never ruled at the federal level and has been limited to ruling a mostly agrarian, sparsely populated state without major industrial output, it is difficult to establish whether the party's proclaimed principles are more than Islamic rhetoric. However, self-sustained growth has often been put forward as an instrument to check the profit-oriented policies of international corporations and PAS' globalization critique heads in that direction. The responsibility of local leaders to guarantee economic growth for the grassroots level of society is in stark contrast with the policies of omnipotent international companies in pursuance of cheap labour markets. PAS has certainly gained some popularity in Kelantan, which has some of the poorest people in the country, by calling for alternative forms of development bearing an anti-capitalist Islamic flavour, for example, by rejecting the impact of globalization on local markets, such as capital flow, exploitation of cheap labour, investment policies that do not benefit the rural population, the role of big Western companies in this process, and so forth. To check uneven development, especially kroni-ekanami in PAS' term, it has placed privatization under the control of its two supervisory bodies PKINK and YAKIN.
Until the late 1990s, the focus has been on enterprises using local resources as a means of profit. Since Kelantan is rich in natural resources and lacks heavy industries, PAS has focused mainly on marble and granite, cement and wood-processing and encourages local companies to generate profits in these sectors, which also benefit the Kelantan state government in terms of raising tax revenues. Meanwhile federal projects in Kelantan have focused on the improvement of infrastructure, especially to overcome the development gap between southern and northern Kelantan. Since these are federal projects carried out as part of national planning--Eighth Malaysia Development Plan (Rancangan Malaysia Kelapan)--and handled by the federal works agency Jabatan Pembangunan Persekutuan (JPP), PAS again has only limited control. For instance, government tenders are mostly given to the private sector, which is largely dominated by corporate construction companies, thus giving PAS little say in choosing contractors that conform to the party's principle of shared benefits (maslaha).
PAS reforms to promote equal distribution in the agricultural sector are more visible. Through its own agricultural redistribution agency, Kumpulan Pertanian Kelantan Berhad (KPKB), which is a subsidiary of PKINK, PAS has established a system of profit-sharing between government and local farmers, giving the latter direct access to profits from crops, mainly rice. Even though the federal government has introduced similar schemes, such as the FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority) programme, to alleviate rural poverty, the plantation sector has increasingly come under the influence of such huge corporate bumiputera conglomerates such as Guthrie, KL Kepong, or Sime Darbie. The major shareholder of these companies is the government, which controls them through the investment trust Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB). Redistribution of profits to the shareholders has been hampered by the direct involvement of the PNB in selecting bumiputera companies for reinvestment. This has turned a scheme initially intended to improve the economic situation of the Malay community as a whole into a profit-generating instrument of the private sector.
PAS has started to involve local and foreign companies in marketing agricultural products and increase the participation of local farmers in these projects under the supervision of the KPKB. Even though not specifically Islamic in nature, these programmes have certainly contributed to the image of a "clean government", which PAS tries to convey in Islamic terms. Considering the fact that mostly it was the lower-middle-class and working-class Malays (who have been at the losing end of Malaysia's rapid economic development) who contributed to the landslide losses of the BN in the general election of November 1999, the topic of a "just distribution of wealth" is certainly highly political in nature. As such, PAS' economic policies at least offer an alternative for those who are directly affected by the widening gap between rich and poor in Malaysia by addressing demands for change in the political as well as economic sector.
Cultural and Social Implications
It is perhaps in the cultural sphere that the PAS government in Kelantan shows its "Islamic face" most clearly. Ironically, it is here that the party comes closest to its political adversary, UMNO. Since the Islamic resurgence in the 1970s and 1980s, both parties have tried to "out-Islam" each other in a bid to gain Malay support. PAS has always been more vocal about establishing an Islamic state, but considering the constitutional and political obstacles in multiracial Malaysia, these plans have been shelved or turned into long-range perspectives, which are not on the actual agenda. To consider the extent of Islamization of the public sphere, one has to bear in mind that religious issues fall under the jurisdiction of the states, giving them a certain amount of space in determining religious policies as long as they do not collide with the federal system. As such, PAS' attempt to implement Qur'anic hudud laws in 1993 should be seen as an attempt to gain political attention, since it was clear from the very beginning that such a notion would neither get the consent of the government nor of most of the non-Muslim voters. On the other hand, PAS has also quietly moved to proscribe other activities that are obviously in contradiction with Islamic teachings.
In late 1992, all video and snooker parlours were closed down and no more permits were approved. Starting from 1993, nightclubs and all establishments serving alcohol were similarly restricted by the local administration on the grounds that they were encouraging drinking, dancing, close proximity between men and women, and "unruly, unrestrained behaviour". To further avoid the offence of "close proximity" (khalwat), separate counters were set up for the sexes in supermarkets and shopping complexes. The licences for shops to sell liquor were reduced from thirty in 1989 to six in 2000 (Dinsman 2000, p. 118-20). Prostitution was banned altogether and buildings where these activities were suspected to take place were torn down by the authorities. However, these are steps by no means different from those undertaken by UMNO or by states not being governed by PAS. Especially since the general election in 1999, the competition between both parties about the true face of Islam has gained momentum again. This is largely due to the fact that PAS' victory has been perceived by UMNO as proof of a new Islamic resurgence, which it tries to counter with "more Islam". Instead of returning to its own slogan "clean, efficient and trustworthy", which was propagated by Mahathir in the early 1980s, and thus countering PAS' accusations of corruption, nepotism, and corporate politics, UMNO again appeals to Malay Islamic identity. To foster Islam, UMNO has recently introduced new shari'a laws in the southernmost province of Johor for offences like sodomy, prostitution, incest, premarital sex, and lesbianism, which can be punished by caning and jail. Probably the states of Selangor, Kedah, and the federal territory of Kuala Lumpur will follow suit with similar enactments. The northern state of Perlis has been the latest one to introduce the new "Islamic Faith Bill 2000" which enables shari'a courts to prosecute deviationist Islamic teachings and detain offenders in rehabilitation centres for up to a year. Several steps have also been taken to ensure that only the "correct form" of Islam is propagated, a move aimed at curbing PAS from spreading the latter's interpretations of Islam. Mosque committees, which have so far been chosen locally, will be appointed by state governments to avoid infiltration by PAS. On a larger scale, two government bodies have been set up, the National Islamic Action Council and the Malaysian Islamic Welfare Council, whose main purpose is to explain UMNO's view of Islam to the people.
An important factor in religious policies is the ethnic factor and PAS has repeatedly tried to convince the non-Muslim, mainly Chinese, electorate that it would not suffer any limitations to their religious and cultural freedom, citing the guarantees made for minorities in the early Islamic states. As a matter of fact, however, PAS has always been a Malay-based party which has never acquired any characteristic of being multiethnic in nature, not even in its earlier days, when it pursued a more nationalistic, Barisan-like approach. Apart from this, Kelantan is a mainly Malay-populated state, which has a much lower percentage of non-Muslim minorities than states such as Selangor and Johor, thus making it easier for the state government to accommodate Chinese demands (which number 4.6 per cent of Kelantan's population). For example, at various state administrative levels, Chinese have been elected as representatives and social programmes have been set up to provide housing for low-income groups among the Chinese, Indian, and Thai minorities.
Since PAS is lately reiterating its plans to establish an Islamic state, it can only be speculated what PAS' attitude towards non-Muslim minorities would be if it were to take over the federal government. After the failure of the multi-ethnic party coalition in the BA, PAS is actively seeking the conservative core support of Malay voters in the east coast states, alienating Chinese voters further who may have still supported the "clean governance" approach of PAS after the election in 1999 but do not see much future in a largely Malay-dominated project of Islamic governance.
Governing Terengganu
Terengganu is the latest state that has come under the rule of PAS after the general election in November 1999. Even though policy-wise there is not much difference between Kelantan and Terengganu, the latter presents the "new" PAS under the leadership of Haji Abdul Hadi Awang. Much more than Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the menteri besar of Kelantan, Awang represents the reformist wing within PAS (Nasir Awang 2000, pp. 25-32). The shift within the party had become apparent during its General Assembly (Muktamar) held in Kuala Terengganu in June 2000. The Islamic state rhetoric had gone and had been replaced by the challenges of the global economy, e-commerce, and a globalized world culture. To cope with these developments and to provide a convincing alternative to UMNO's modernization programme, the "new" PAS developed a more secularized approach, replacing the "Islamic State" with the "Islamic Social Order" (Hj. Fadzil Md. Noor 2000, p. 11).
Already after the election victory in November 1999 in Terengganu, PAS was confronted with the realities of putting its programme into practice. More than Kelantan, which had been under PAS rule for ten years, Terengganu had become a testing ground for PAS' neo-reformist policies, since the state has enormous offshore reserves of oil. PAS could use the oil revenue to propel its economic policy and demonstrate the viability of its "Islamic approach". If successfully carried out, PAS would prove its accusations of corrupt practices within the ruling BN and the inequitable outcome of UMNO's economic policy. However, PAS was denied the means to do so. Compared with Kelantan, oil-rich Terengganu holds much more economic value to the UMNO federal government for the latter to give up control of the state resources so easily. Less than one year after PAS took over the state, the federal government stopped royalty payments to Terengganu made by the state-owned Petronas oil company. The funds, around US$200 million per year, have been put under a central development fund administration, effectively cutting off 80 per cent of Terengganu's annual budget (Meyer 2000, pp. 23-24). Thus PAS' aspirations of economic reform and alternative development boosted by considerable oil revenues evaporated overnight. In such a situation, the spotlight fell on the party's new Islamic policies such as the shutting down of bars and liquor outlets, the banning of gambling, and the restrictions on socializing between the sexes. Focus on these things highlighted the fundamentalist inclinations of the party and raised public concerns about the Islamic state. One outcome was to see foreign investment and Chinese capital flow out of the state. Under such circumstances, PAS "Islamic experiment" would seem to have fallen short of the Wawasan Sihat ("Healthy Vision") project of the previous BN government in Terengganu. Wawasan Sibat had the aim of establishing the "first Islamic civil society" world-wide based on "rapid industrial growth, sustainable economy, low rate of poverty, emergence of local entrepreneurs and high productivity" and featuring "a balance between human and physical development, a balance between sectors and a balance of infrastructural development between areas" (B.N. Ghosh 1999, pp. 185-86). Thus the Terengganu experiment illustrates PAS' failure in its bid to offer an alternative to that of UMNO. Ultimately the party had to fall back on Islamic rhetoric. Even though the PAS administration tried to regain the trust of the Chinese business community by lifting the ban on pig farming, its policies of Islamic zeal such as the ban on karaoke parlours and pubs and the segregation into separate male and female lines in supermarkets and stores have inconvenienced the business community, which is well-represented by the Chinese community. The Terengganu state Parliament recently adopted the Islamic hudud laws even though PAS knew it would not be able to enforce them because of constitutional constraints at the federal level (Mustafa Kamal Basri 2002, p. 1). This is a replay of the 1992-93 PAS initiative in Kelantan.
Conclusion
The social and cultural manifestations of Islam throughout the world have led to perceptions that Islamic communities are gravitating towards a rigid orthodoxy when practising their faith. However, in the case of Malaysia, political realities have forced those who are proclaiming Islamic orthodoxy to be very flexible in adjusting to political and legal predicaments. No political party in Malaysia has reflected these dilemmas more drastically than PAS. From its nationalist origins, PAS has moved to the discourses of an Islamic state inspired by the Iranian revolution. "Islamic democracy" has been as much part of its ideological spectrum, as have been the ultra-conservative hudud laws or its rigid measures to ensure Islamic "morality" in the two east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu. The overlapping of modernizing and traditional Islamic discourses has led to unexpected twists and turns, being influenced by political and tactical considerations rather than by an adherence to the orthodoxy of religious tenets. These political considerations have often taken the lead in the battle between PAS and its political rival UMNO for the hearts and minds of the Malay voters. Thus, the Islamic project of PAS has shown much less continuity than the dominant position of the religious dogma and the party's defence of Islamic fundamentalism would lead us to expect at first glance. The function of Islam in the competitive politics of PAS and UMNO is to serve as an indicator of unresolved social and economic problems in Malaysian society.
NOTES
(1.) Barisan Nasional or National Front is the ruling coalition in Malaysia. Seeking to represent the country's multi-ethnic communities, it is led by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and comprises also the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), and various other smaller parties.
(2.) Assabiyah denotes narrowly defined interests of either ethnic or kinship groups but is also used by Islamists to condemn nationalism in general as being contrary to the Islamic perception of an universal bond uniting mankind regardless of racial, national, and social backgrounds in its submission to Allah.
(3.) The Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU) was formed as a coalition of the Malaysian opposition in 1989 in order to challenge an UMNO that was weakened by a 1987/88 party split. The APU consisted of Patti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), Semangat 46 (an UMNO break-away led by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah), and some other smaller Islamic parties. In Chinese-dominated areas, Semangat 46 formed a coalition front--Gagasan Rakyat--with the Chinese-led Democratic Action Party (DAP). This was a tactic for the DAP to avoid being perceived by its Chinese supporters as buying into a coalition that had PAS' Islamic state proposal as its ideological backbone.
(4.) Mahathir, who was unwilling to make the shari'a the only basis of the constitution--contrary to PAS' model of a Malaysian Islamic state--had to rely on Islamization policies in the social and cultural sphere. He introduced Islamic banking (1983), an Islamic International University (1983), and other Islamic institutions. Qur'an reading competitions were held regularly and Islamic programmes were shown on television. These provided PAS with the argument that Mahathir's Islamic policies were merely cosmetic in nature to gain Malay votes.
(5.) PAS attempted to introduce hudud laws in 1992 in the east coast state of Kelantan, which it ruled since 1990. Hudud laws follow the Qur'anic code of punishment, which include stoning for adultery, crucifixion for murder, amputation for theft, and so on. This required amending the country's constitution and to do that, PAS needed a two-third majority in the federal Parliament, which it did not have. Thus the federal government in the hands of UMNO was able to block the introduction of hudud laws at state level. UMNO could also use federal prerogatives to order the police and judiciary in the PAS-controlled state not to enforce hudud.
(6.) In 1995 PAS elected a new leadership under Fadzil Noor and Haji Abdul Hadi Awang that pursued the aim to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia. In September 1998, in what was believed to be a power struggle in UMNO, Prime Minister Mahathir sacked Anwar Ibrahim from his post as deputy prime minister and arrested him for "corruption" and "sodomy". His treatment in jail and the following court proceedings contributed to the rise of a large protest movement known as refarmasi. The anti-UMNO feelings generated by this incident are believed to have contributed to BN electoral losses in the November 1999 election.
(7.) Al-Arqam offered an Islamic economic model run like a co-operative. For details, see Muhammad Syukri Abdullah (1992).
(8.) A number of laws were introduced in the 1980s to curb public dissent and to secure the hegemony of the government. The Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for unlimited detention without trial and had been initially introduced by the British, remained in place and was complemented by the Universities Act, the Printing Presses and Publication Act, and the Societies Secrets Act. See also Mauzy and Milner (1983).
(9.) Shortly after Mahathir had announced Vision 2020 at a meeting of the Malaysian Business Council in 1991, PAS came up with its own version, the Wawasan Akhirat ("Vision of the Hereafter"), which stressed human aspects of modernization. For details, see the PAS manifesto for the 1990 general election, Manifesto Pilihanraya 1990 "Masyarakat Penyayang" (1990).
(10.) The BA comprised PAS, the Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP), and keADILan, a Malay-based multi-ethnic party established by Wan Azizah, the wife of the sacked deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, in December 1998, as well as the Malaysian Socialist Party, Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM). The DAP left the coalition in September 2001 after tensions with PAS over the Islamic state.
(11.) The constitutional crises of 1982/83 and 1991/93, as well as the UMNO split of 1987/88, the financial crisis of 1997/98, and Anwar's sacking in 1998 had led to an erosion of public confidence in the state and its institutions, police, Parliament, and judiciary, as well as in the ruling coalition itself.
(12.) Ghadbian particularly mentions the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as an example of an Islamic group that tries to change the political system by working within its institutions.
(13.) To justify its flexible adjustment to realpotitik, PAS has made a distinction between eternal Islamic principles (at-thawabit) and matters that are feasible given a certain political context (al-mutaghayyirat).
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Jan Stark is Lecturer at the School of Humanities, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia. He can be contacted at jan@usm.my.
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